Next page.-------------- Link to intrologic.htm
Your reading is from Does the Center Hold? by Donald Palmer. Unfortunately, these pages are not in the third edition (greenish page numbers refer to the 4th edition, and dark blue page numbers refer to the 5th edition) so I have copied the material inro this webpage so that people who got the third edition can still do the reading.
This is basically what I want you to read for
Tuesday.
If you have limited time, concentrate on the topic of
"origination" introduced on page 228, and discussed here beginning with the
third paragraph below.s
Read, study, think.
This readining is in three parts. First, there's the text I want you to read. (Reproduced for the benefit of those with 3rd Edition)
Second is the text repeated with reading questions.
Third is the important bits repeated a third time with thinky questions.
Enjoy.
Reading not present in 3rd edition.
These pieces of text appear in the 4th edition, but not in the third.
I have assigned you to read pages 226-237 in 4th Edition. I was just reading our text book and noticed that there is a very important passage on page 226. So I want you to read that too.
, or pages ##-## in 5th Edition
Read pages 138-146 in 3rd Edition, or pages 132-147 in 4th Edition
On page 226 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Some contemporary determinists, both soft and hard, respond to these criticisms, challenging them with one or the other of a couple of remarkable arguments. One of these arguments zeroes in on the demand that true responsibility presupposes true freedom, and true freedom exists only when the agent has true alternatives. In other words, says the libertarian, Samantha's act was a free act only if Samantha could have done other than she actually did do. In response to this claim, some compatiblists argue that the correct analysis of the phrase, "she could have done otherwise...," is achieved by translating it into a hypothetical conditional phrase, such as this: "she could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to." Then they assert that the phrase, "she could have done otherwise if she wanted to," is compatible with determinism, because desires, wants, and intentions are causes of actions. Samantha's desires, wants, and intentions may well have been produced by Skinnerian or Freudian-type causal circumstances (or more likely just by the laws of neurochemistry), but she is still free in the most important sense of that word: she wants to do X., and she can do X.. As determinist Ted Honderich says, "there is nothing about actions being voluntary in their initiation that conflicts with determinism. For determinism, voluntary actions are ones that have a certain kind of causal history, as distinct from any non-causal history."
I'm ignoring the Harry Frankfurt stuff, because I think it's pointless.
On page 227 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes.
Honderich admits that he cannot prove that universal determinism is true. He concedes that recent developments in the field of physics called quantum mechanics (which we will inspect shortly) may seem to have raised questions about the determinists thesis, but he suspects that eventually quantum theory itself will prove to support determinism. (He admits that his view on this topic is not popular among many physicists, but, he says "perhaps it is not too much the worse for that".) However, even if it turns out that he is wrong in thinking that the new physics will demonstrate support for determinism, Honderich points out that quantum theory applies only to the subatomic world, not the world of human-sized objects or even brain-size objects, so Honderich will accept "near-determinism" if he must.
On 228 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes.
In other words, the libertarian and the hard determinist both think the true meaning of the idea of freedom is "origination," or uncaused thoughts and actions originated by the agent herself; while the compatiblists thinks that the true meaning of the idea of freedom is simply being able to do what you want to do. But in fact, both meanings exist and have installed themselves deeply in our psyches. According to Honderich, determinism says we can keep the latter meaning but must give up the former, and giving up the former involves a somewhat painful sacrifice. We can no longer blame or praise people's actions the way we normally do, and we will certainly have to abandon practices of punishment if their sole purpose is retribution (to dish out pain, or impose restrictions on people because they deserve it), nor will we be able to praise or reward people for actions on the grounds that they were the result of "free choice" in the old, now discredited, sense. Neither can we be proud of ourselves for our freely chosen accomplishments.
On page 235 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Some libertarians are attracted to the idea that free will is an emergent biological property that developed evolutionarily, that such powers of free thought and action "are ontologically emergent, while still being powers and properties of the biological organisms." such an emergent property would be much more complex than the typical emergent properties discussed in science (such as liquidity being an emergent property present in neither oxygen nor hydrogen, but present in certain combinations of those elements[h2o]). Also, it is not clear that such a move provides much explanatory power -- that is, it doesn't answer as many questions as it needs to -- but if such a model even makes sense, perhaps it could be developed to overcome certain scientific objections to the idea of free will.
Some critics of free will are willing to entertain the possibility of random uncaused thoughts (perhaps echoing the occasion of Heisenberg's subatomic particles), but they have claimed that such a model does not provide a theory of freedom and responsibility of the type libertarians desire. If saying that a person could have chosen otherwise than she did when she made a particular choice means that her choice could have gone against her personal desires, hopes, intentions, and reasons, then such a free choice would be purely arbitrary and have nothing to do with the agent. Libertarians have certainly wanted free will to be more than a series of random events. But one libertarian approach, which might be traced as far back as to Aristotle is open to the possibility that such "random thoughts" are indeed a significant part of human freedom. Aristotle concentrated on the process of deliberation in his discussion of free will. When a young man, call him Mike, deliberates, for example, about accepting a job offer in Oregon or Outer Mongolia, a number of ideas may cross his mind that might be correctly considered as "arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, or matters of luck and chance" as Robert Kane says. Yet, according to Kane, these random thoughts might make a difference in the decision Mike makes. Though Mike has no control over some of these thoughts and images, "he would be in control of how he reacted to those thoughts and images once they did occur". Kane claims that the arbitrariness of the thoughts that enter into Mike's decision would not prevent his decision from being perfectly rational. This scenario does not give the libertarians the full freedom that they desire, but, says Kane, "perhaps this is as much as libertarians can hope for".
Later on page 236, Palmer writes
"according to Kane's view, the only kinds of acts that need to be undetermined are "those acts by which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are -- mainly, the "will-setting" or "self-forming actions" that are required for ultimate responsibility." Certain kinds of existential decisions -- decisions that may be influenced by the past but are not caused by the past -- create who we are."
Palmer later quotes Kane as saying "I think it may be a truth that tells us something important about free will. It tells us that every undetermined self-forming free choice is the initiation of what might be called a value experiment whose justification lies in the future and is not fully explained by past reasons. In making such a choice we say, in effect, "let's try this. It is not required by my past, but it is consistent with my past and is one branching possibility in garden of forking paths my life can now meaningfully take. Whatever it is the right choice, only time will tell. Meanwhile, I'm willing to take responsibility for it one way or the other."
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Okay, now read it again, but this time think about my reading questions as you go.
In preparing this material, I found that I wanted to focus very closely on certain key sentences, so I'm putting my questions right in the middle of the text I'm quoting. To make it clear what parts of this are my questions, and what parts are quoted from the text book, I'm putting my questions into bold type.
On page 226 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Some contemporary determinists, both soft and hard, respond to these criticisms, challenging them with one or the other of a couple of remarkable arguments. One of these arguments zeroes in on the demand that true responsibility presupposes true freedom, and true freedom exists only when the agent has true alternatives. In other words, says the libertarian, Samantha's act was a free act only if Samantha could have done other than she actually did do. In response to this claim, some compatiblists argue that the correct analysis of the phrase, "she could have done otherwise...," is achieved by translating it into a hypothetical conditional phrase, such as this: "she could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to." Then they assert that the phrase, "she could have done otherwise if she wanted to," is compatible with determinism, because desires, wants, and intentions are causes of actions. Samantha's desires, wants, and intentions may well have been produced by Skinnerian or Freudian-type causal circumstances (or more likely just by the laws of neurochemistry), but she is still free in the most important sense of that word: she wants to do X., and she can do X.. As determinist Ted Honderich says, "there is nothing about actions being voluntary in their initiation that conflicts with determinism. For determinism, voluntary actions are ones that have a certain kind of causal history, as distinct from any non-causal history."
What is presupposed by true responsibility?
What is presupposed by true freedom?
Under what conditions is Samantha's act a free act?
What do some compatiblists argue is the correct analysis of the phrase "she could have done otherwise?"
Why do compatiblists think this new phrase is compatible with determinism?
What kinds of things do compatiblists think are the causes of actions?
What does it mean to say that something is the cause of an action?
What is meant by the phrase "causal history?"
What kind of causal history do voluntary actions have?
What kind of causal history could make an action non-voluntary?
What would a noncausal history look like?
On page 227 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes.
Honderich admits that he cannot prove that universal determinism is true. He concedes that recent developments in the field of physics called quantum mechanics (which we will inspect shortly) may seem to have raised questions about the determinists thesis, but he suspects that eventually quantum theory itself will prove to support determinism. (He admits that his view on this topic is not popular among many physicists, but, he says "perhaps it is not too much the worse for that".) However, even if it turns out that he is wrong in thinking that the new physics will demonstrate support for determinism, Honderich points out that quantum theory applies only to the subatomic world, not the world of human-sized objects or even brain-size objects, so Honderich will accept "near-determinism" if he must.
What kind of objects are affected by quantum indeterminacy?
What kind of objects are not affected by quantum indeterminacy?
According to this excerpt, can quantum indeterminacy affect our volitional process?
On 228 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes.
In other words, the libertarian and the hard determinist both think the true meaning of the idea of freedom is "origination," or uncaused thoughts and actions originated by the agent herself; while the compatiblist thinks that the true meaning of the idea of freedom is simply being able to do what you want to do. But in fact, both meanings exist and have installed themselves deeply in our psyches. According to Honderich, determinism says we can keep the latter meaning but must give up the former, and giving up the former involves a somewhat painful sacrifice. We can no longer blame or praise peoples actions the way we normally do, and we will certainly have to abandon practices of punishment if their sole purpose is retribution (to dish out pain, or impose restrictions on people because they deserve it), nor will we be able to praise or reward people for actions on the grounds that they were the result of "free choice" in the old, now discredited, sense. Neither can we be proud of ourselves for our freely chosen accomplishments.
What does the libertarian think is the true meaning of the idea of freedom?
What does the hard determinist think that the true meaning of the idea of freedom is?
What is "origination?"
What does "uncaused" mean?
What does "originated" mean?
What does "originated by" mean, as opposed to, say, "originated in" or "originating in?"
What does the compatiblist think is the true meaning of the idea of freedom?
On page 235 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Some libertarians are attracted to the idea that free will is an emergent biological property that developed evolutionarily, that such powers of free thought and action "are ontologically emergent, while still being powers and properties of the biological organisms." such an emergent property would be much more complex than the typical emergent properties discussed in science (such as liquidity being an emergent property present in neither oxygen nor hydrogen, but present in certain combinations of those elements[h2o]). Also, it is not clear that such a move provides much explanatory power -- that is, it doesn't answer as many questions as it needs to -- but if such a model even makes sense, perhaps it could be developed to overcome certain scientific objections to the idea of free will.
Try to come up with your own example of an emergent property.
In your own words, what is an emergent property?
Later that same page, Palmer writes:
Some critics of free will are willing to entertain the possibility of random uncaused thoughts (perhaps echoing the occasion of Heisenberg's subatomic particles), but they have claimed that such a model does not provide a theory of freedom and responsibility of the type libertarians desire. ........
What is a "random uncaused thought?"
......... If saying that a person could have chosen otherwise than she did when she made a particular choice means that her choice could have gone against her personal desires, hopes, intentions, and reasons, then such a free choice would be purely arbitrary and have nothing to do with the agent. .........
Take the above sentence and try to put it into your own words
Maybe give the person a name, and illustrate it with an example of a choice.
............ Libertarians have certainly wanted free will to be more than a series of random events. .........
What is a random event?
What is a series of random events?
What do libertarians want free will to be?
............ But one libertarian approach, which might be traced as far back as to Aristotle is open to the possibility that such "random thoughts" are indeed a significant part of human freedom. Aristotle concentrated on the process of deliberation in his discussion of free will. When a young man, call him Mike, deliberates, for example, about accepting a job offer in Oregon or Outer Mongolia, a number of ideas may cross his mind that might be correctly considered as "arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, or matters of luck and chance" as Robert Kane says. Yet, according to Kane, these random thoughts might make a difference in the decision Mike makes. Though Mike has no control over some of these thoughts and images, "he would be in control of how he reacted to those thoughts and images once they did occur". Kane claims that the arbitrariness of the thoughts that enter into Mike's decision would not prevent his decision from being perfectly rational. This scenario does not give the libertarians the full freedom that they desire, but, says Kane, "perhaps this is as much as libertarians can hope for".
What is a "random" thought?
What is the meaning of the words "arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, or matters of luck and chance?"
In Mike's deliberation process, what does he not have control over?
What would he be in control all?
Would the arbitrariness of the random thoughts necessarily make Mike's decision irrational?
Later on page 236, Palmer writes
"according to Kane's view, the only kinds of acts that need to be undetermined are "those acts by which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are -- mainly, the "will-setting" or "self-forming actions" that are required for ultimate responsibility" Certain kinds of existential decisions -- decisions that may be influenced by the past but are not caused by the past -- create who we are."
According to Kane's view, what kinds of acts need to be undetermined?
What is a "will-setting" act?
What is a "self-forming actions" act?
What does it mean to say that an act is required for ultimate responsibility?
What kind of decisions create who we are?
Are these decisions influenced by the past?
According to Kane, are these decisions caused by the past?
Palmer later quotes Kane as saying "I think it may be a truth that tells us something important about free will. It tells us that every undetermined self-forming free choice is the initiation of what might be called a value experiment whose justification lies in the future and is not fully explained by past reasons. In making such a choice we say, in effect, "let's try this. It is not required by my past, but it is consistent with my past and is one branching possibility in garden of forking paths my life can now meaningfully take. Whatever it is the right choice, only time will tell. Meanwhile, I'm willing to take responsibility for it one way or the other."
What is an undetermined choice?
What is a self-forming choice?
What is a free choice?
What is an undetermined self-forming free choice?
What do you think Kane means by "value experiment?"
Just exactly how does indeterminism figure in this process?
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Thinky questions.
This time I'm putting the quotes in bold.
Could we experience both free will and
determinism if incompatiblism is true?
Do you experience yourself as making
some decisions freely?
Do you experience technology as working
reliably?
Do you experience your actions as being determined by your
decisions?
Does our experience of the world support or contradict
incompatiblism?
Can you give even one personally experienced example of a real system that does not follow the deterministic laws of physics?
Without assuming that incompatibilism is true, can you give one example of a feature of your experience that is truly indeterministic?
(Remember, most deterministic systems are unpredictible, and many are highly unpredictible, while all predictible systems are deterministic.)
If we don't assume incompatiblism, do we have any reason to
think that determinism isn't true?
If we don't assume incompatiblism, do we
have any reason to think that free will doesn't exist?
In your opinion, which
theory is better supported, compatiblism or incompatiblism?
What would your life be
like if your brain and body did things at random?
Would you like it if what
you did next was not determined by what you're thinking now?
Is there a third
choice between determinism and indeterminism?
If our brains worked at random,
would we have free will?
Would you get on an airplane if aerodynamics might or might not keep it in the air?
Would any technology work if
determinism wasn't true?
Do you experience yourself as making
some decisions freely?
Do you experience technology as working
reliably?
Do you experience your actions as being determined by your
decisions?
Does our experience of the world support or contradict
incompatiblism?
If we don't assume incompatiblism, do we have any reason to
think that determinism isn't true?
If we don't assume incompatiblism, do we
have any reason to think that free will doesn't exist?
In your opinion, which
theory is better supported, compatiblism or incompatiblism?
Palmer writes that "it must be demonstrated that the agent's desires are under his or her control" and "it is not obvious that such control would be compatible with any form of determinism." I want to ask you the following questions:
1. Has Palmer given any good reason why free will, under any definition, requires that the agent's desires are under his or her control?
2. To what degree are your desires under your control? Could you instantly make yourself desire foods you currently hate? Could you instantly make yourself stop wanting the things you currently most want?
3. When you do manage to deliberately change one of your desires, do you do it at random, or do you do it in response to a thought process that takes into account your other desires and your memory of what happened the last time you acted on the desire you're trying to change?
4. Say you desire some ice cream, and you act on that desire, does the fact that you didn't make yourself desire the ice cream mean that the act of eating ice cream wasn't an act of free will?
5. Say your desires come to you indeterministically. If your desires came to you independently of preceding conditions, which include your previous experiences and previous desires, so that the fact that you had, say, a lifetime love of chocolate and a lifetime hatered of licorice, that would have absolutely no bearing on whether you desired chocolate or licorice right now, would you consider that as the only condition under which you could have free will?
Thinky questions.
Again, I'm going to focus very closely on certain key sentences, so I'm putting my questions in right in the middle of the text I'm quoting.
On page 226 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Says the libertarian, Samantha's act was a free act only if Samantha could have done other than she actually did do.
This is a key part of the libertarian argument against soft determinism, so I want you to think very carefully about what it really means to say that someone could have done other than what she actually did do.
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that for four years you attend a certain high school. Every time you enter that high school you walk past the door to the campus safety office. The door is unlocked every time you walk past, and there is never anything there that would stop you from walking in. Over the course of those four years you walk past the campus safety office over one thousand times. You never have a reason to go in. You never even have the slightest whim or impulse to go in. And, as a matter of fact, you never go in. Do you think that it is fair to say that, every single time you walked past the campus safety office, you could have done otherwise? Do you think it's fair to say that, although you never did go in, you always could have gone in to the campus safety office?
Take the time to write down in your own words exactly what you think it means to say that "Samantha could have done other than she actually did do."
In response to this claim, some compatiblists argue that the correct analysis of the phrase, "she could have done otherwise...," is achieved by translating it into a hypothetical conditional phrase, such as this: "she could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to."
Is there any significance between the phrase "Samantha could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to" and your own interpretation of "Samantha could have done other than she actually did do."
Then they assert that the phrase, "she could have done otherwise if she wanted to," is compatible with determinism, because desires, wants, and intentions are causes of actions.
Returning to our thought experiment, if it turned out that every time you walked past the campus safety office without going in, that decision to walk past was precisely determined by your desires, wants, and intentions, would that mean that you could not have gone into the campus safety office?
Remember, I'm asking if you could have done other than you did, not if you did other than you did!
Do you see any reason to think that your determined decision to walk past the campus safety office meant that you could not have done other than you did?
Do you see any significant difference between "she could have done otherwise" and "she could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to?"
Suppose a libertarian says that we should translate the phrase "she could have done otherwise" in a way that includes "she could have done otherwise, if she had not wanted to."
Would this be a better criterion for deciding whether something was done of one's own free will?
Would this make make any sense at all?
Ted Honderich says, "there is nothing about actions being voluntary in their initiation that conflicts with determinism. For determinism, voluntary actions are ones that have a certain kind of causal history, as distinct from any non-causal history."
What is the difference between a causal history and a noncausal history?
If something happened without being caused, could it have been caused by you?
If some event was not caused by you, could that event be an expression of your desires?
If some event was not caused by you, could that event be an expression of your wants?
If some event was not caused by you, could that event be an expression of your intentions?
If an action your body takes was not caused by you, could that action be an expression of your desires?
If an action your body takes was not caused by you, could that action be an expression of your wants?
If an action your body takes was not caused by you, could that action be an expression of your intentions?
If an action your body takes was not caused, could that action be an expression of your will?
Based on our understanding of indeterminism developed in this course, you think it possible that there is something about actions being voluntary that conflicts with indeterminism?
On 228 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes.
In other words, the libertarian and the hard determinist both think the true meaning of the idea of freedom is "origination," or uncaused thoughts and actions originated by the agent herself; .......
I know what "uncaused" means, but what does "origination" mean in this context?
Think about what it would mean to say that a thought of yours was uncaused.
What kind of thoughts are uncaused?
If a thought or an action was uncaused, would it really be appropriate to say that it was originated by the agent herself?
Let us imagine that we have a device that could create an uncaused thought in somebody's mind. Let us suppose we choose as our victim young Bubbles McKenzie, a Scottish-Canadian debutante who loves her grandfather, loves ponies, loves fast cars, and has absolutely no opinion about cheese. Let us suppose that while Bubbles is thinking a bunch of thoughts determined by her wants, desires and intentions, we use our device to make her have one uncaused thought. These are the thoughts she has.
1. I want a new car.
2. My pony is so cute.
3. I should throw cheese at my grandfather.
Now, which of these is most likely to be the uncaused thought? Which of these is least likely to have not been determined by the wants, desires and intentions of young Bubbles McKenzie?
Would it make sense to say that this uncaused thought was originated by Bubbles?
Would it perhaps make more sense to say that this uncaused thought originated "in" Bubbles?
If a thought is uncaused, can it possibly be an expression of your will?
If a thought has absolutely nothing to do with anything you care about, can it be an expression of your will?
Was the uncaused action originated by Bubbles, or was it merely originated in Bubbles?
How important is this difference?
Let us imagine that we crank our device up a notch, and create in Bubbles an uncaused action. Again, this action comes inside a group of caused actions. Here is that uncaused action, buried in a list of caused actions.
1. Bubbles changes the oil in her car.
2. Bubbles pelts her pony with chunks of rancid cheese.
3. Bubbles visits her grandfather, makes him a nice dinner, and listens appreciatively to stories she's already heard a hundred times.
Now, which of those would you think is most likely to be the uncaused action?
If you have the time and inclination, sit down and write out a list of uncaused actions that you could do.
If you're having trouble thinking up uncaused actions, just write down a list of all possible actions, as many of you can think of, the weirder, the better.
If one of the actions on your list is something you might want to do, cross it off the list. (If you did it because you wanted to, it wouldn't be uncaused.)
If one of the actions on your list is something you might like to do, cross it off the list. (If you did it because you liked it, it wouldn't be uncaused.)
If one of the actions on your list is something you might need to do, cross it off the list. (If you did it because you need to, it wouldn't be uncaused.)
And so on.
Would you ever want to do an uncaused action?
If you found yourself doing an uncaused action, would you be happy about it?
Is there any meaningful sense in which an action can be originated by you, while not being caused by you?
In this context, what does "originated" mean?
Is it logically possible for an action to be "originated" by me if that action is not caused by me?
Wouldn't it perhaps make better sense to say that an action was "originated" by me if and only if it was caused by my own wants, desires and intentions?
(I'm just saying.)
..... while the compatiblist thinks that the true meaning of the idea of freedom is simply being able to do what you want to do. ...........
What else could it be?
Seriously, if we were not thinking about determinism, what else would we say freedom is?
....... But in fact, both meanings exist and have installed themselves deeply in our psyches.
Do you have the idea that freedom requires that your actions be uncaused installed deeply in your psyche?
If you did, where would you go to have it removed?
...........According to Honderich, determinism says we can keep the latter meaning but must give up the former, ...........
Which one is the latter?
Which one is the former?
Which one can we keep?
Which one must we give up?
Is Honderich asking us to give up the idea that we cause our own actions?
Or is he asking us to give up the idea that some of our actions are uncaused?
Is he perhaps asking us to give up the idea that some of our actions are "originated," in the sense of being uncaused?
And giving up the former involves a somewhat painful sacrifice.
Seriously, how painful could it be to give up the idea that your actions have to be random to be free?
What is it about uncaused actions that could make it painful to admit that a free willed action was caused by my wants, desires and intentions?
Where's the pain here?
We can no longer blame or praise people's actions the way we normally do,
Say what?
Where did this come from?
Let me get this straight, Honderich is saying that if an action is caused by persons wants, desires and intentions, then we can't praise or blame him for doing it!
Presumably, this means that we could only praise or blame actions if we know they are uncaused.
Let us apply this criterion to our thought experiment. If Honderich is right, and we can only praise or blame uncaused, "originated" actions, then we cannot praise Bubbles for giving attention to her boring grandfather, because that action was caused by her love for said grandfather, but those of us who enjoy the sight of an innocent pony being pelted with rancid cheese may legitimately praise Bubbles because this action was not caused, and therefore might be considered "originated" in the sense of the quote above. Does this make sense to you?
...... and we will certainly have to abandon practices of punishment if their sole purpose is retribution (to dish out pain, or impose restrictions on people because they deserve it), ........
Or this?
..........nor will we be able to praise or reward people for actions on the grounds that they were the result of "free choice" in the old, now discredited, sense.
Wait a minute! What is the "old" sense of "free choice" here?
Does Palmer mean that the sense of "free" as meaning "uncaused" is the old sense of "free choice?"
I'm pretty old, and I never heard of that! I think the old sense of free choice is not being forced into doing it.
This idea of "free" meaning "uncaused" is a pretty newfangled idea in my book!
................Neither can we be proud of ourselves for our freely chosen accomplishments...............
Why the #$*% not?
On page 235 of the 4th edition, Palmer writes:
Some libertarians are attracted to the idea that free will is an emergent biological property that developed evolutionarily, that such powers of free thought and action "are ontologically emergent, while still being powers and properties of the biological organisms."
Why would libertarians be attracted to this idea?
Is that anything about the concept of an emergent property that says it can produce uncaused actions?
If a property can produce actions, could those actions be uncaused?
What do you think the term "ontologically emergent" means?
If it just means "emergent," then I'm okay with it.
Do you think that it's possible that the fully deterministic behavior of a fully deterministic system could ever produce indeterministic results?
If you do, where would that indeterminism come from?
....such an emergent property would be much more complex than the typical emergent properties discussed in science (such as liquidity being an emergent property present in neither oxygen nor hydrogen, but present in certain combinations of those elements[h2o]). ............
So what's the problem with that?
Consciousness is an emergent property, isn't it?
The human brain that produces consciousness is incredibly complicated, isn't it?
Do we have any reason to think that deterministic systems cannot get complicated?
Come to think of it, do we have any reason to think that indeterministic "systems" can get complicated?
Also, it is not clear that such a move provides much explanatory power -- that is, it doesn't answer as many questions as it needs to --
Is this helpful?
Seriously, is this sentence any use whatsoever?
.... but if such a model even makes sense, perhaps it could be developed to overcome certain scientific objections to the idea of free will.
What scientific objections to the idea of free will?
Seriously, I don't know any scientific objections to the idea of free will!
Do you know any scientific objections to the idea of free will?
(I mean, objections made by actual scientists.)
Some critics of free will are willing to entertain the possibility of random uncaused thoughts (perhaps echoing the occasion of Heisenberg's subatomic particles), but they have claimed that such a model does not provide a theory of freedom and responsibility of the type libertarians desire. ........
Are we just talking about critics of free will here?
Is it impossible for compatiblists, who accept free will, to also entertain the possibility of random uncaused thoughts?
......... If saying that a person could have chosen otherwise than she did when she made a particular choice means that her choice could have gone against her personal desires, hopes, intentions, and reasons, then such a free choice would be purely arbitrary and have nothing to do with the agent. .........
How did you do in translating the sentence in your own words?
That bad, huh?
Here's my attempt:
"If saying that Bubbles could have chosen not to visit her grandfather means that she could have made a choice that would have gone against her own personality, then that "free choice" to blow off her grandfather would be random from Bubbles's point of view, and would in fact have nothing what so ever to do with Bubbles."
Hey, I know. I'll put it in the form of a dialogue. That will be cool.
Compo. I think Bubbles Mackenzie is a good person. She visited her grandfather, cooked him dinner, and listened to his boring stories.
Libby. But she didn't do it of her own free will.
Compo. Yes she did. She chose to do it. No one made her do it. And she could have gone to a party instead.
Libby. None of that matters, because she did not originate the action.
Compo. Yes she did! She thought of it, and then she did it.
Libby. No, an action can only be "originated" if it is uncaused. Bubbles's action was caused by her love for her grandfather which, given her personality meant that she could not do otherwise.
Compo. Yes she could. She could have gone to the party, if she had wanted to!
Libby. Aha! You said "if she had wanted to." The criterion is not "she could have done otherwise, if she had wanted to." It's "she could have done otherwise."
Compo. Do you mean to tell me that you think that we can only say that bubbles could have gone to the party, if it's true that she could've gone to the party even if she had not wanted to.
Libby. Exactly. That's what "could have done otherwise" means.
Compo. Well, as a matter of fact, she still could've gone to the party, even though she didn't want to, because no one would have stopped her if she had tried.
Libby. Oh come on! You know Bubbles. You know what kind of person she is. She could not possibly have gone to that party when she knew that her grandfather needed her.
Compo. I think you mean that she "would not," not "could not."
Libby. No, it's "could not." If her personality determined her actions, then she could not have done otherwise.
Compo. Well, if that's true, that's exactly what makes Bubbles a good person..
Libby. No, it means that she did not act of her own free will.
Compo. Well, what would be of her own free will?
Libby. An uncaused action originated by Bubbles herself.
Compo. Such as what?
Libby. Such is anything that was not caused by Bubbles's personality, but which was originated by Bubbles.
Compo. I'm not sure that's possible. Can you give me an example of such an action?
Libby. Sure. Let's say she fills her sports car with cold spaghetti. She loves that car, and so if her personality determines what she does, she could never fill it with cold spaghetti. So if she ever did fill her sports car with cold spaghetti, we would know she had done an uncaused action that was originated by herself.
Compo. I can see the "uncaused." Where is the "originated?"
Libby. Well the idea originated in her mind. It was uncaused, but it was originated by her.
Compo. If her personality and mental processes didn't make it happen, then she didn't originate it.
Libby. Sure she did. That's what makes filling her sports.with cold spaghetti a free act.
Compo. No, it makes it completely arbitrary event that has absolutely nothing to do with Bubbles.
Does that help? Can you tell which one is the libertarian, and which is the compatiblist?
............ Libertarians have certainly wanted free will to be more than a series of random events. .........
This is news to me.
Let's say we have in front of us a series of random events.
Make up your own list of crazy stuff.
What could we add to that series that would make it more than a series of random events?
Could we make it more than a series of random events without adding some determinism?
............ When a young man, call him Mike, deliberates, for example, about accepting a job offer in Oregon or Outer Mongolia, a number of ideas may cross his mind that might be correctly considered as "arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, or matters of luck and chance" ................
At this point, I want you to think very carefully about the relationship between determinism and predictability. You should be aware by now that some deterministic systems, particularly complicated ones, can be extremely unpredictable. In fact, it is possible for a deterministic system to throw out things that nobody could ever expect. For instance, weather is a deterministic system, but every so often this deterministic system throws out something utterly unexpected, like a tornado in Los Angeles. Such things seem completely random to the observer, but they are in fact precisely determined by the deterministic operations of a deterministic system. So a deterministic system can throw out things that "might be correctly considered as arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, or matters of luck and chance" ................
Given that deterministic systems can throw up things that nobody could possibly have predicted, do we have compelling reason to think that any of these ideas are in fact undetermined?
Has anybody so far given us any reason to think that anything random ever happens in anybody's brain?
......... Yet, according to Kane, these random thoughts might make a difference in the decision Mike makes. Though Mike has no control over some of these thoughts and images, "he would be in control of how he reacted to those thoughts and images once they did occur". Kane claims that the arbitrariness of the thoughts that enter into Mike's decision would not prevent his decision from being perfectly rational........
Let's say, for the sake of argument, that there is a little randomizing device, based upon the decay of uranium atoms, inside Mike's head. Let us also say that this device results in Mike having uncaused, or at least undetermined thoughts. These thoughts would certainly be arbitrary, capricious, random, uncontrolled, irrational, inexplicable, and matters of luck and chance.
Let us say that the device is set to a very low level of randomicity. It produces random thoughts like "I hate cheese," "the sky is green,""I wish I had three nostrils," and so on at a very low level. Would Mike be able to make a completely rational decision if he found himself periodically having sex random thoughts?
Let us say that the randomizing device is hooked to his process of choosing between Omaha and Outer Mongolia. Let us say that the randomizing device kicks in when and only when it turns out that Mike finds Omaha and Outer Mongolia equally appealing. When all is said and done, Mike is unable to choose, and so the randomizing device kicks in and Mike makes an undetermined decision. Given that the appeals of Omaha exactly balance the appeals of Outer Mongolia, would you say that Mike's decision was irrational?
Now let us say that the randomizing device kicks in at random, and it so happens that Mike is delighted by every aspect of the proposed job in Outer Mongolia, and considers Omaha to be a detestable place. Unfortunately, the randomizing device kicks in and makes him choose Omaha. For a brief shining moment, until common sense returns, Mike is committed to accepting the job in Omaha, a place he absolutely detests. Now, would you say that Mike was being rational or irrational in the moment that he chose to abandon the chance of a dream job in Outer Mongolia for drudgery in detestable Omaha?
Later on page 236, Palmer writes
"according to Kane's view, the only kinds of acts that need to be undetermined are "those acts by which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are -- mainly, the "will-setting" or "self-forming actions" that are required for ultimate responsibility" Certain kinds of existential decisions -- decisions that may be influenced by the past but are not caused by the past -- create who we are."
If an act is undetermined, can it be an act by which we do anything?
If an act is undetermined, can it be an act by which we make ourselves into anything?
If an undetermined act makes us into a certain kind of person, can we truly say that we made ourselves into that person?
If an act is undetermined, can it possibly be the kind of action that sets our will?
If an act is undetermined, can it possibly be the kind of act by which we form ourselves?
If an act is undetermined, can we be responsible for its consequences?
What is the difference between "influenced by" and "caused by?"
If influence is not a causal relationship, what is it?
Palmer later quotes Kane as saying "I think it may be a truth that tells us something important about free will. It tells us that every undetermined self-forming free choice is the initiation of what might be called a value experiment whose justification lies in the future and is not fully explained by past reasons. In making such a choice we say, in effect, "let's try this. It is not required by my past, but it is consistent with my past and is one branching possibility in garden of forking paths my life can now meaningfully take. Whatever it is the right choice, only time will tell. Meanwhile, I'm willing to take responsibility for it one way or the other."
Is there any difference between this and saying "let's do stuff at random, and see how it works out?"
Is there anything in this that requires any of our actions to be truly undetermined?
Is there anything in any of the reading so far that gives us any reason to think that free decisions must be undetermined?
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Potential questions for Quiz
Um, look at the reading questions again.
How To Make Up Quizzes
If for some reason, (illness, family emergency, conflicting academic obligation, sudden discovery that you have superpowers coupled with the need to save the Earth from a hurtling asteroid that only you can deflect), you miss one of my delightful quizzes, you can make up the lost points by writing up a clear, precise, and deeply insightful answer to one of the potential exam questions and turning the results in as "make-up quiz." Illustrations are not absolutely necessary, but would add a nice touch.
Potential Exam Questions
1. Explain and critically analyze the "could have done otherwise" argument for incompatiblism, and critically compare it to the argument(s) for compatiblism and/or necessitism
2. Explain and critically analyze the "origination" argument for incompatiblism, and critically compare it to the argument(s) for compatiblism and/or necessitism
3. Explain and critically analyze the argument for incompatiblism that is based on the idea that without the libertarian/hard determinist idea of "origination," we could not praise or blame people for their behavior.
4. Critically analyze the idea that "ontological emergence" could allow us to have free will even if incompatiblism is true
5. Critically analyze the idea that accommodating our decision-making processes to random events could possibly allow us to have free will even if incompatiblism is true
6. Critically analyze the idea that will-setting and self-forming actions need to be undetermined because they are the decisions that are required for ultimate responsibility.
Any exam answer can be enhanced by addition of any comments that occur to you. The more you think about a topic, the more likely you are to come up with something that can earn you a little more credit for your answer. I never deduct points, so it can't hurt to add your own thoughts.
Copyright © 2008 by Martin C. Young
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